Philosophy of Computational Social Science by Benthall, Sebastian
Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 12, no. 2, 2016 
 
 






ABSTRACT: Computational social science is an emerging field at the intersection of statistics, 
computer science, and the social sciences. This paper addresses the philosophical foundations 
of this new field. Kant and Peirce provide an understanding of scientific objectivity as 
intersubjective validity. Modern mathematics, and especially the mathematics of algorithms 
and statistics, get their objectivity from the intersubjective validity of formal proof. Algorithms 
implementing statistical inference, or scientific algorithms, are what distinguishes computational 
social science epistemically from other social sciences. This gives computational social science 
an objective validity that other social sciences do not have. Objections to the scientific realism 
of this philosophy from the positions of anti-instrumentalism, postmodern interpretivism, and 
situated epistemology are considered and either incorporated into this philosophy of 
computational social science or refuted. Speculative predictions for the field of computational 
social science are offered in conclusion: computational social science will bring about an end of 
narrative in the social sciences, contract the field of social scientific knowledge into a narrower, 
more hierarchical field of expertise, and create a democratic crisis that will only be resolved 
through universal education in computational statistics. 
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Computational social science has been defined as an emerging scientific field at the 
intersection of statistics, computer science, and the social sciences (Counts et al., 2014; 
Mason, W. et al., 2014) Many researchers and students today are developing 
computational social science by synthesizing the practices of these fields with little 
thought to the intellectual foundations of their work. As the new field becomes more 
successful, it will be necessary to develop the philosophical theory underlying these 
practices as a science. This will both guide researchers in the epistemic norms of their 
own practice and intellectually position computational social science relative to other 
social sciences. This paper explains these intellectual foundations, addresses several 
critical objections, and concludes with predictions about the field that extend logically 
from these arguments. 
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Section 1, “Scientific Algorithms”, outlines a philosophy of computational social 
science based on the history of philosophy of computation, statistics, and rationality. It 
also gestures at theoretical and empirical work by social scientists that is consistent 
with this philosophy despite not being computational. 
 
Section 2, “Responding to Criticism”, raises critical objections to the position 
outlined in Section 1. These objections are drawn from social sciences, such as Science 
and Technology Studies, that are tangential to computational social science and the 
fields from which it originates. This section also responds to these criticisms from the 
perspective of the computational social scientist. 
 
Section 3, “Predictions”, draws out the logical consequences of the foundations of 
computational social science to make several predictions about this new scientific field. 
These are intended both as theoretical claims subject to intellectual debate and 
empirical claims about the future of computational social science. 
1. SCIENTIFIC ALGORITHMS 
Statistics and computer science have a long shared intellectual history that has gone by 
various names: artificial intelligence, machine learning, data science. There is 
widespread consensus within the field about the firmness of its mathematical 
foundations and appropriate application of its methods (Russell et al. 2003). 
The social sciences, in contrast, are heterogeneous and fragmented into 
‘disciplines’. This has been attributed to the difficulty of establishing legitimacy and 
consistent funding within a university setting, and to the fact that social science 
researchers are so often researching what interests them based on their personal values 
(boyd 2016). The social sciences are also fragmented because their political relevance 
means that its institutional conditions are often influenced by political power, which is 
both a cause and effect of the lack of credibility in the social sciences relative to the 
“hard” sciences (such as physics) (Bourdieu 2004). 
Computational social science can be seen as an opportunity to extend the rigor 
and objectivity of computational statistics to the study of social phenomena. It 
accomplishes this through use of what I will call “scientific algorithms,” special 
algorithms that perform the logical operations that correspond to an ideally rational 
observer. These algorithms are designed through an ongoing process of collective 
reasoning that ensures that they represent the impartial consensus of rational 
investigators, free from the bias of any partial perspective. 
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History of rational and pragmatic epistemology 
The history of scientific epistemology is long. Without doing justice to its full 
trajectory, two important milestones are noteworthy for the arguments in this paper. 
The first is Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, I., 1781/2007). This work 
resolved a tension that existed at the time between two schools of thought about the 
foundation of knowledge. Locke had proposed that the senses were the foundation of 
all knowledge. Everything was learned through qualities perceptible to the senses. This 
seemed a plausible explanation for learning at the time. Contrary to this, Descartes 
had proposed that the foundation of all knowledge was logical thought. He famously 
proposed that the first step a philosopher should take is to doubt their senses and 
question whether the world they perceived was the creation of an evil demon. 
Neither of these views proved satisfying and Kant had a profound solution. Rather 
than treat the project of epistemology to be the discovery of a “God’s eye view” of 
reality that lay beyond all human experience (the noumenon), he proposed that 
philosophy should uncover the reality that was available to human perspective. This 
has been called the transition from transcendental realism to transcendental idealism 
(Allison, 2004), because it changed the view of what was “really real” (transcendental) 
from “real” objects to what was available as an idea. 
A consequence of this change in perspective was that Kant could argue 
philosophically from shared human experience of perception and reasoning. He 
argued that the foundation of knowledge was transcendental reason that discovered the 
lawful structure of the sensed world and the corresponding logical concepts needed to 
understand it. He believed this transcendental reason was available to all rational 
subjects. It therefore gave its conclusions objectivity, not in the sense of being 
independent from any mind and experience, but rather by being independent from the 
particularity of any individual’s mind or experience. 
A second important milestone in the history of epistemology is the work of logician 
Charles Peirce, who is largely considered to be the founder of the school of thought 
known as pragmatism. Peirce’s pragmatism emphasized two points. First, knowledge is 
for action; what makes an idea distinctive is that it has a distinctive effect on the 
pattern of behavior of one who has it (Peirce, 1878). Second, the scientific enterprise is 
a social one. Reason is not an individual accomplishment but rather something that 
reaches its highest potential when it is used to settle disagreements between persons 
(Peirce, 1877). For classical pragmatism, the truth is defined as the ideal consensus of 
rational investigators over time. 
The most important thing to take away from a study of Kant and Peirce is that the 
project of science is the project of discovering truths that are robustly intersubjective. 
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Kant discovered that knowledge can be universal even though it is subjective. What 
makes subjective knowledge universal for Kant is that it is discovered through 
universal principles of reason. Peirce acknowledged more individual difference than 
Kant but restored the idea of universal scientific knowledge by showing how scientific 
knowledge is developed through the pursuit of agreement between different subjects. 
We will use this principle of robust intersubjectivity as the standard of knowledge 
throughout this discussion of philosophy of computational social science. 
These old ideas from the 18th and 19th centuries may seem far removed from a 
philosophy of computational social science. Nevertheless, they are important steps in 
the history of scientific thought and especially the underlying epistemology of the social 
sciences. Many students today have never studied Kant or Peirce and so have never 
thought through these philosophical perspectives.  
Algorithms and intersubjectivity 
The 20th century saw the transformation of the world through the power of digital 
computing. What many people don’t know is that origins of the digital computer were 
rooted in a radical transformation in the philosophy of mathematics and logic. 
Computing technology is based on the logical relationship between the modern 
algorithm and the modern mathematical proof. What made these new proofs and 
algorithms so powerful--powerful enough to transform society all over the world--was a 
new standard of rigor that established greater intersubjective validity in mathematics. 
Before the discovery of modern logic, mathematics had proceeded in what today 
looks like an informal and haphazard way. This process is demonstrated in the most 
skillful way by Lakatos (1976), who tells the story of a theorem in geometry as a 
dialogue between students in a classroom that condenses a debate that occurred over 
several centuries. Over the course of history, the standards of what was considered to 
be a valid form of mathematical argument were the subject of active debate.  
In the early part of the 20th century, a number of discoveries changed the way 
mathematics was done. For a number of reasons that are beyond the scope of this 
paper, the mathematical consensus shifted to the view that a proof had to consist in a 
finite number of mechanically repeatable steps within a formal system of symbols. 
What made this systematic way of thinking so compelling was how many different 
mathematical representations could be shown to be reducible or equivalent to each 
other within a common framework of metalogic. 
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (1910) showed that mathematical 
proofs about the natural numbers could be reduced to a more basic mathematics, set 
theory. Alonzo Church would show how this method of formal proof could be used to 
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define the set of computable functions, which take input data and return output data. 
Later it was proven that Church’s lambda calculus was equivalent to the mathematical 
description of the famous Turing Machine, which was the blueprint for Alan Turing’s 
physical computing machine. (Li and Vitanyi, 2008, p.24. Irvine, 2003) 
The success of digital computing comes in no small part to these discoveries of the 
equivalence between computation and mathematical reasoning. An algorithm, in the 
modern sense, is in many ways logically equivalent to a mathematical proof. What 
they have in common is how they guarantee that any person or any machine taking 
the same steps from the same starting point will get the same result. 
We can see this as a continuation of the trajectory of science started by Kant and 
Peirce. Mathematical logic and computer programming jointly took a step forward for 
science’s ability to arrive at robust intersubjective conclusions. It did this by 
formalizing mathematical proof and then implementing these proofs as algorithms. 
Algorithms are operations that in principle can be performed both by people and 
machines, or some combination of them. Regardless of who or what performs these 
operations, the relationship between the input and output of the algorithm is always 
mathematically the same. Mechanical algorithms are a way of extending the powers of 
collective thought. When these algorithms are verifiable and verified by thousands of 
mathematicians, programmers, and machines, there is no room for bias from partial 
perspective within its systems. 
In some ways formal logic without data is like Descartes trying to reason about the 
world without using his senses. It cannot be the whole philosophy of science. These 
computational tools have been combined with the mathematics of inference from data, 
statistics, to be the powerful foundation of computational science we know today. 
Statistics and rationality 
Concurrent with the discover of the modern algorithm and its connection with 
mathematical proof, the 20th century saw great strides in theories of statistics, 
rationality, and the mind. Mathematicians used formal proof to expand the axioms of 
probability to develop the laws of statistical inference. Bayesian inference, a method in 
statistics whereby one updates one’s subjective beliefs about the world based on 
rigorous analysis of new data, has proven especially effective in contemporary machine 
learning techniques. 
It must be noted that Shannon’s information theory, which made modern 
telecommunications possible, was also derived from the axioms of probability. A 
mathematical synthesis of information theory with theory of computation was 
accomplished almost simultaneously by Solomonoff, Chaitin, and Kolmogorov in the 
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form of algorithmic information theory. This informs thinking about machine learning 
algorithms today. (Li and Vitanyi, P. 2008) 
An important feature of Bayesian statistics is that according to its method, one is 
guaranteed to converge on the true understanding of the phenomenon studied as one 
collects more data about it. Astute statisticians will note the many assumptions that 
need to be true for this to be the case. Much of contemporary statistics research is 
devoted to what kinds of inferences can be made with only finite data (as opposed to 
the theoretically infinite data of asymptotic guarantees). But in practice, our limited 
understanding of statistical theory has not prevented its wide adoption for its 
aspirational qualities. Because of its promise of converging knowledge, statistics is a 
way to approach intersubjectively valid knowledge of the sensory world. 
According to the successful computational cognitive science paradigm, all 
cognition can be modeled as computational information processing. To a large extent 
the laws of rational thought have been codified in basic statistical and computational 
theory. (Anderson, 1991; Chater and Oaksford, 1999; Chater and Vitanyi. 2003; 
Russell et al., 2003; Griffiths, T. et al., 2008; Tenenbaum, J., et al., 2011) 
Contemporary machine learning and artificial intelligence is mainly just the 
implementation of these principles in machine systems designed to accomplish an 
expanding range of tasks. 
A philosophically deep point about both statistical theory and theory of 
computation is that the same mathematical principles that were developed as laws of 
rational thought are now used as laws of nature governing technology we use every 
day. Information theory, derived from the axioms of probability theory much like 
Bayesian reasoning, is essential for the design of telecommunication codes and 
networking protocols. Complexity theory and theory of computation, originally 
theories of what was provable by mathematicians, are now used to design computer 
algorithms. The term “artificial intelligence”, which is as old as Turing, captures this 
correspondence well. We are intelligent; so are our artifacts: because we share a logic. 
We may call algorithms that implement statistical inference scientific algorithms, and 
consider computational social science as the application of scientific algorithms to 
understand social phenomena. The centrality of scientific algorithms in computational 
social science gives it, more than any other social science to date, the potential for the 
discovery of objective truth. This objectivity is won through the reproducibility of its 
results: through formal proof in the case of its logical foundations, and as calculations 
algorithmically performed in the case of substantive empirical research. The scientific 
use of scientific algorithms affords the social sciences with a new horizon. 
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2. CRITICAL OBJECTIONS 
The philosophy of computational social science described above is a form of scientific 
realism: it takes the discoveries made by scientific consensus to be real, or more real 
than the contents of the perspectives of those who are not participating in the scientific 
social process. For many good reasons, the social sciences have for decades harbored 
many philosophical objections to this kind of realism. Among these are critiques of 
scientific instrumentalism, postmodern interpretivism, and standpoint epistemology.  
While each of these positions has played an important political role in the history 
of the social sciences, they are each inconsistent with the philosophical foundations of 
computational statistics. Therefore, from the perspective of computational social 
science, they are incorrect. This section will summarize three classes of critical 
objection to the foundations of computational social science, and respond to each. In 
each case, there is something to be learned from the objection. These lessons learned 
should be considered as much part of the philosophy of computational social science as 
the veracity of scientific algorithms. 
Critiques of instrumentalism  
One important critique of science and technology that surfaced in the 20th century 
alongside the discovery of modern computation is the accusation that it may be 
excessively instrumental. “Instrumental” here means that it enables scientists and 
technologists to improve the means to reach their goals without informing what those 
goals should be in the first place. For example, Heidegger (1954) famously argued in a 
poetic style that technology that is first used to treat nature as a resource to be 
extracted and controlled will one day be used to treat humanity as a controlled 
resource. 
Horkheimer (1947) levelled a similar objection specifically to what he saw as a 
disastrous synthesis of formalized reason and pragmatism. He argued that formalizing 
reason would lead to people forgetting how to reason naturally for themselves, and 
that pragmatism, because it is indifferent to its ends, leads people to forget to reason 
about what is truly moral. His book-length argument was one of many condemnations 
of capitalism that contributed to the influential Frankfurt School of criticism. In this 
broadly Marxist framework, technology is a form of capital that operates according to 
its own logic. If left unchecked, it will enslave, not liberate, humanity. 
This is a fearsome criticism to computational statistics and especially its 
applications to the social sciences. There are two responses from the perspective of the 
philosophy of computational social science. 
The first is that this concern about the instrumentalism of science is the product of 
a specific historical context: post-war Germany, in a world where the advance of 
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nuclear physics was giving many causes for concern about the unchecked progress of 
science (Carson, 2010). These concerns were about the power unleashed by the 
physical sciences. It would be misplaced to bring the same concerns to the exact 
sciences of computational theory and statistics. 
The second response is that nothing about computational social science precludes 
it from being a study of ends as well as a study of means. Indeed, a mathematized 
ethics that has the same robust intersubjectivity as a mathematical proof would be the 
most wonderful discovery one could hope for from computational social science. It can 
overcome this objection by explicitly taking moral and ethical values as an object of 
study within its scientific field. 
Postmodern interpretivism 
A second class of objections to scientific realism can be characterized as postmodern 
interpretivist objections. These objections come from schools of thought that originate in 
the humanities and can be thought of as an extension of the methodological 
assumptions of the humanities into the sciences. By considering all phenomena to be 
like texts to be interpreted, these objectors argue that the special authority of scientists 
is undeserved because after all theirs is just another interpretation. 
It is difficult to maintain this objection in light of the specific history of 
mathematics and computation. Once one understands just how intersubjective 
verifiability is the condition of a scientific algorithm, the claim that scientific 
algorithms result in interpretations that are as valid as any other interpretation stops 
being credible. But perhaps because this history of computation and the philosophical 
progress it depends on is not widely known, the postmodern critique is alive and well 
in even recent scholarship. 
Much of the success of the postmodern critique of science can be attributed to 
Bruno Latour, who is influential in Science and Technology Studies today. For 
example, here is how he is used in a widely cited article, “Critical Questions for Big 
Data: Provocations for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon” by 
boyd and Crawford (2012): 
‘Numbers, numbers, numbers,’ writes Latour (2010). ‘Sociology has been obsessed 
by the goal of becoming a quantitative science.’ Sociology has never reached this goal, 
in Latour’s view, because of where it draws the line between what is and is not 
quantifiable knowledge in the social domain. 
Big Data offers the humanistic disciplines a new way to claim the status of 
quantitative science and objective method. It makes many more social spaces 
quantifiable. In reality, working with Big Data is still subjective, and what it quantifies 
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does not necessarily have a closer claim on objective truth – particularly when 
considering messages from social media sites. But there remains a mistaken belief that 
qualitative researchers are in the business of interpreting stories and quantitative 
researchers are in the business of producing facts. In this way, Big Data risks 
reinscribing established divisions in the long running debates about scientific method 
and the legitimacy of social science and humanistic inquiry. 
Boyd and Crawford anticipate the evolution of Big Data (an industry buzzword 
referring to the algorithmic analysis of large-scale data, especially social data) into 
computational social science. As primarily humanistic researchers, they emphasize the 
element of data analysis that is most available to the humanities: the interpretation of 
results. In so doing, they downplay the differences between qualitative and quantitative 
research methods, ignoring how the latter are accumulation of centuries of 
accumulated technical procedure that is subject at each generation to rigorous 
scientific scrutiny. That computational social science would reinscribe an 
understanding of the importance of the scientific method in establishing facts is not a 
risk, it is a condition of doing computational social science properly. This is not to say 
that there isn’t a role for interpretation in computational social science. It is just not 
the same as the role it plays in the humanities.  
This would be all there is to say on this topic were it not for a pernicious tendency 
in interpretivist rhetoric to maintain this objection not through logic, but through 
stylistic ambiguity. This fallacious form of argumentation was once defended as a part 
of postmodernist scholarship by Lyotard (1984) as “legitimation by paralogy”. 
Bourdieu (2004) characterizes these tactics like so: the critic makes an ambiguous claim 
that has both a radical interpretation and a banal one. For example, the claim that 
scientific facts are artificial can be interpreted to mean that they are untrue, or instead 
that they are the result of a social or cognitive process of creation. Without engaging 
the long lineage in philosophy of explanation of how we arrive at true conclusions 
through social and cognitive processes, the critic begins political mobilization based on 
the insinuation that the facts are fake while having prepared their path of retreat in 
advance. 
By saying facts are artificial in the sense of manufactured, Latour and Woolgar 
intimate that they are fictitious, not objective, not authentic. The success of this 
argument results from the ‘radicality effect’, as Yves Gingras (2000) has put it, 
generated by the slippage suggested and encouraged by skillful use of ambiguous 
concepts. The strategy of moving to the limit is one of the privileged devices in pursuit 
of this effect … but it can lead to positions that are untenable, unsustainable, because 
they are simply absurd. From this comes a typical strategy, that of advancing a very 
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radical position (of the type: scientific fact is a construction or — slippage — a 
fabrication, and therefore an artefact, a fiction) before beating a retreat, in the face of 
criticism, back to banalities, that is, to the more ordinary face of ambiguous notions 
like ‘construction’, etc. 
Latour would later repudiate his radical position on the grounds that it was 
irresponsible to undermine the authority of science when those critiques would be used 
by climate change deniers to advocate for socially damaging policies (Latour, 2004). 
And on the eve of Big Data, he would be bullish about the role of quantification in 
sociology, though it would require a different use of statistics than has been 
traditionally used in the natural sciences (Latour, 2010). Recently developed 
algorithmic methods for understanding network data prove this point in practice. Late 
Latour is more or less in agreement with the scientific consensus of computational 
social science. 
Boyd and Crawford have indeed composed their “provocations” effectively, 
deploying ambiguous language that can be interpreted as a broad claim that 
quantitative and humanistic qualitative methods are equivalent in their level of 
subjectivity, but defended as the banality that there are elements of interpretation in 
Big Data practice. But these provocations should not be confused with proof. They are 
reminders that though scientific algorithms can make computational social science more 
objective, there will always be the problem of the perspective of the interpreter. This 
problem is characterized well by the third major objection to scientific realism, 
standpoint epistemology. 
Situated epistemology 
A third objection to the scientific realism implied by the offered philosophy of 
computational social science is the objection that knowledge is situated, meaning that 
knowledge is always dependent on the context in which it is learned and the position 
of its subject. (Brown,, Collins, and Duguid, 1989) Often the claim that situated 
knowledge is privileged over a ficticious “God’s eye view” is associated with feminist 
epistemology, which emphasizes how women are differently situated from men and 
the implications this has for philosophy of science (Haraway 1988; Anderson, 2015). 
Computational social science must concede the core of the situated 
epistemologist’s argument as an indisputable fact. Any individual human’s knowledge 
is situated by virtue of the human condition. And their perspective will be partial 
because their access to data will be (a) finite and (b) biased by their position. This 
conclusion follows from the mathematical theory of computation and statistics as 
much as it does from other philosophical or theoretical argument. 
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Where computational social science must part ways with the situated 
epistemologist is how it sees science in relation to partial perspective. For the 
computational social scientist, impartial knowledge is still the scientific ideal. It is 
achieved collectively and through the historical process of verifying logical argument 
and collecting and processing more data. Merely human partiality can be overcome, 
gradually, through the use of scientific algorithms. One might say that the success of 
computational social science depends on the social construction of an algorithmic 
situation which is capable of knowing about society more fully than other social 
sciences. This algorithmic situation is collectively and intersubjectively validated in the 
process of its construction, and continues to be validated afterwards through the 
practice of computational social science. 
Partial perspectives, or the individual understandings of particular subjects, are 
important as objects of study to the computational social scientist but not valid in their 
own right. They have validity only to the extent that they are validated in processes of 
intersubjective verification. This motivates a fascinating research problem in 
computational social science: the algorithmic collection and representation of 
composite perspective. Properly representing multiple perspectives, with their 
differences and similarities, would be both a substantive and logical advance in the 
logic of the social sciences (Benthall, 2016).  
3. PREDICTIONS 
The first section of this paper outlined a philosophy of computational social science 
based on an understanding of the scientific algorithm as convergently valid 
intersubjective inference. The second section addressed prominent critical objections 
to this view. This third and final section draws speculative conclusions from the 
preceding arguments. This philosophy of computational social science suggests that 
this field will challenge the centrality of narrative in the social sciences. In so doing, it 
will become a contracting field, deep and abstract like physics, with a narrowing 
population of experts. This will result in a crisis of democratic governance as political 
expertise, which will be synonymous with computational social scientific expertise, 
becomes esoteric and untrusted. The solution to this crisis will be universal education 
in the principles of computational social science. 
End of narrative 
One of the pioneers of contemporary quantitative sociology, Miller McPherson, 
developed a sociological theory that explained many phenomena as the result of 
relatively simple mechanism: populations are sampled from an underlying 
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multidimensional feature space, or Blau space, and their origin in the space determines 
their place in the social network. (McPherson, 1983; McPherson and Ranger-Moore, 
1991). This work has inspired contemporary computational social scientists (e.g. Kim 
and Leskovec, 2012) 
In a paper surveying this work, McPherson (2004) reflects on “the cost of Blau 
space”--how sociologists might be dissatisfied with the kind of explanation his theory 
provides. “We lose a vast amount of local detail,” he writes, because social explanation 
comes from macro-level structure rather than micro-level interactions. “The usual 
sociologist’s reaction to this is to feel somehow dissatisfied with this explanation 
because it accords too well with common sense.”  
We give up the stories. The uniqueness of each individual’s path through time and 
Blau space is sacrificed for the generality of reducing that path to a vector of 
coordinates which characterize position in time, geography, and social structure. The 
discourse, the negotiated reality, the micro exchanges are all relegated to the spline 
generator of the homophily principle of Blau space. 
Most importantly, we give up the claim to agency. The mechanism that drives 
movement in Blau space is not very amenable to political, social, or emotional 
manipulation. The distribution of action across the vast social distances of Blau space 
reduces the forces of individual human agency to a mere whisper beyond the 
immediate social environment. Taking in the social world through Blau space mutes 
even the ponderous tones of organization and institution. For those committed to 
maintaining the traditional social science view (or those in need of a vibrant story line 
for MBA students), Blau space will be an uncomfortable venue for dialogue. It remains 
to be seen whether the benefits will overcome the discomfort. 
What McPherson warns for his model of Blau space may well be extended to other 
manifestations of computational social science as well. Because computational social 
science uses computational models for explanation not narration, it must at its core 
“give up the stories”. However effective they may be for persuasion, narratives will not 
capture the formal mechanisms posited by computational social science. They will be 
window dressing, the thought provoking anecdote of an introduction, not the 
substance of knowledge. 
As McPherson notes, this end of narrative will threaten notions of agency based on 
narrative. It will also threaten other social scientific disciplines who have prioritized 
interestingness (Healy, 2015) over predictive power. Because of the emphasis on formal 
and statistical verifiability, computational social science will determine many 
interesting narratives to be untrue or misleading. Those that it can confirm will likely 
be disappointing from an academic perspective because they will be a confirmation of 
“common sense”. 
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Contraction 
A consequence of the asymptotic convergence of statistical inference that drives 
computational social science is that the range of hypotheses open to scientific debate 
will contract over time. Whereas today the social sciences are broad and shallow, 
accommodating a wide range of explanatory theses, much of this breadth can be 
attributed to the “data poor” origins of many social sciences. In some fields a case 
study providing an interesting illustration is considered enough data to make a claim to 
knowledge. As the quantity of data available for inference grows, scientific work using 
smaller data sizes will become increasingly anecdotal, a kind of storytelling. 
There are two ways larger data sets can diminish social scientific hypotheses 
developed using smaller ones. The first is to show that the patterns identified in a 
weaker hypothesis were not signal, but noise. If a small data set confirms a hypothesis, 
a large data set may prove the apparent structure of the small data was only due to 
chance. All hypotheses must stand up to the test against the great null hypothesis that 
the social phenomena that appear are random manifestations of unformed chaos. 
The second way larger data sets can diminish social scientific hypotheses is by 
showing how they are reducible to laws of nature. This is not so much a contradiction 
of social science as its evolution, but nevertheless it results in a contraction of the 
scientific field. For the more social science can be reduced to laws, the more it becomes 
a narrow but deep field akin to mathematics as opposed to the broad and shallow field 
of empirical observation. Acquiring social scientific knowledge will be a matter of 
learning increasingly abstract and complex theory. This will in turn result in a 
changing social structure of expertise, which will be more hierarchical as the 
knowledge it conveys deepens. 
Democracy and divide 
If the above arguments are correct and computational social science, through its 
commitment to intersubjective verifiability, becomes increasingly abstruse, then the 
emergence of this scientific field will have strange political consequences. The available 
of social data available for processing expands with the ubiquity of computing and 
telecommunications. Data scientists at commercial organizations and in government 
use this data for social control, and computational social science will be instrumental to 
these efforts. In the near future it is unlikely that all citizens will be equipped with the 
tools of computational social science. This creates an uncomfortable differential in 
social power that among other problems threatens the idea that citizens are 
knowledgeable enough to reflect on how they are to be democratically governed. 
While questions of the role of experts in democracy are not new, the fact is that 
many fields that once claimed social scientific expertise are being displaced by 
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computational social science. Research has already shown that the subtle art of 
political prediction, a core competency for those involved in policy and governance, is 
better performed by simple statistical inference than by alleged “experts” (Tetlock, 
2005) A sober analyst would conclude that computational social science is destined to 
be the foundational science of future law. 
In the meantime, it faces deep distrust from critics. Pasquale (2015) has noted that 
many machine learning algorithms are so complex that they are difficult for lawyers to 
understand, and has concluded that something so complex should not be allowed to 
exist. This argument ignores how it is mathematically infeasible to solve a complex 
problem in a simple way. (Burrell, 2016) Metcalf and Crawford (2016) have noted that 
data science (another term for computational statistics) can draw many interesting 
conclusions from public data, and argue that in order for data science to be trusted as 
a science, it needs to regulate itself according to an enriched standard of human 
subjects research ethics. This argument ignores how computational statistics is simply 
an extension to an individual’s capacity for rational thought and inference. To deny 
the data scientist the ability to study public data will one day be seen as akin as 
denying a person the right to see and think. 
While there may well be important lawful regulations of the application of 
computational social science, they need to be designed with a full understanding of the 
potential of the field. They also need to be designed in such a way that they do not 
deny future generations access to the very knowledge that will enable them to govern 
themselves. Rather than restricting computational social science to highly trained 
experts, we should be looking for ways to make it a part of universal education like 
literacy. 
Just as literacy made modern democracy possible, so too will computational social 
science make a new kind of enlightened self-governance possible. This will require a 
tumultuous change in the nature of expertise and education. Until this is 
accomplished, the biggest challenges for computational social science are not going to 
be scientific ones. They will be political. 
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